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ABSTRACT
This paper is con cern ed  with the 
relationship between the secondary- 
market price o f sovereign debts and 
the possib ility  o f repudiation and 
retaliation . Using the d istin ction  
betw een ‘good ’ and ‘bad ’ states o f 
world, the indebted countries optimal 
repu d iation  rate as well as the 
cred itor ’s optim al retaliation and 
reservation price for any repudiation 
rate are a n a lyzed  u n d er  the 
assu m p tion  that the debtor and 
c re d ito r  are r isk  averse  and 
expected-utility maximizers. Matching 
b o th  d e b to r  a n d  c r e d i t o r ’ s 
considerations, the chapter analyzes 
the C o u rn o t-N a sh  e q u ilib r iu m  
repudiation and retaliation rates and 
the secon dary  m arket price o f  a 
sovereign debt.
N o te :  T h is  p ap er  w as p resen ted  in the  13th Econom ic  T h e o ry  W orkshop, 
hosted  by th e  A u s tr a l ia n  N a t io n a l  U n iv e rs i ty  in F e b r u a r y  1995 .
1 Introduction
A country’s external debt is a sovereign debt. Hence, a rise in 
a country’s level of indebtedness increases its incentive to 
repudiate (Kenen, 1990). The secondary market for sovereign 
debts has been a mechanism for alleviating countries’ 
external-debt burden and increasing the expected debt 
repayments. In this market, an indebted country expects to 
buy back its debt at a discount, reflecting the creditors’ belief 
that the country will not meet its external obligations fully. In 
this respect, Berg and Sachs (1988), who fitted a tobit model to 
developing countries’ debt discounts, have concluded that 
higher income inequality leads to a greater discount, while 
higher outward orientation, agricultural share, and GNP per 
capita squared tend to decrease the secondary market 
discount. Other market-based debt-reduction schemes have 
been discussed by Krugman (1989) and non-market-based 
debt-relief arrangements by Sachs (1989).
The simplest conceptual approach for explaining the 
secondary prices of sovereign debts is based on the notion of 
the Debt-Laffer Curve (Krugman, 1988) and the distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states of world implying that the 
sovereign debt repayment has the following binomial 
distribution:
1 -p
P
( 1)
where,
D = the book value of the sovereign debt,
p = the probability of a ‘bad’ state of world, and
1
r = the rate of repudiation.
Consequently, that approach suggests that the price of a 
sovereign external debt (P) in the secondary market can be 
approximated by the ratio of the expected debt repayment to 
the book value of the debt:
p _  E(DR) _ | _ rp (2)
That is, the discount on a dollar of debt is equal to the 
repudiation rate times the probability of a ‘bad’ state of world 
in which the country’s revenues are too small for servicing its 
external liabihties.
The drawbacks of the approach described above are that it 
does not provide an explanation for the rate of repudiation 
and does not take into account creditors’ retaliation as well as 
risk aversion of both the indebted sovereign and creditor. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual analysis of 
the relationship between the secondary-market price of 
sovereign debt and the possibility o f repudiation and 
retaliation under the assumption that both creditor and debtor 
are risk averse, maximize expected utility and take each 
other’s reaction into account. The analysis assumes that the 
creditor’s retaliation is limited to seizing the debtor’s assets 
abroad and restrained from escalation to a trade warfare. It 
also assumes that the indebted country is relatively small and 
facing competitive foreign lenders so that the creditor and 
debtor should not be viewed as being engaged in an implicit 
reputation contract. As has been argued by Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989):
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[a] good  r e p u t a t i o n  fo r  r e p a y i n g  f o r e i g n  l o a n s  d o e s  n o t  e n h a n c e  
a  s m a l l  c o u n t r y ’s a b i l i t y  t o  b o r r o w  a b r o a d .  A s  l o n g  a s  t h e  
c o u n t r y  f a c e s  c o m p e t i t i v e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s ,  t h e n  a n y  s e r v i c e  
p r o v id e d  b y  t h e  c u r r e n t  l e n d e r  c a n  e q u a l l y  w e l l  b e  p r o v id e d  b y  a  
n e w  i n v e s t o r ,  (p. 4 7 )
Using the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states of 
world, the creditor’s optimal retaliation and reservation price 
for any repudiation rate as well as the indebted country’s 
optimal repudiation rate for any level of retaliation are 
analyzed in the following sections. The Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium  repudiation and retaliation rates and the 
secondary market price of sovereign debts are found 
subsequently by matching both debtor’s and creditor’s 
considerations under the assum ption of sym m etric 
information about the state of the world.
2 The creditor’s optimal seizure rate for a given 
repudiation rate
The formulation of the creditor’s behaviour is based on the 
belief that in a ‘good’ state of world the indebted country 
enjoys relatively high revenues and is able to repay its 
liabilities; whereas in a ‘bad’ state of world the indebted 
country ’s revenues are moderate and consequently it 
repudiates part or all of its external debts. Using this 
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states of world, the returns 
for the creditor, y, are perceived to have the following 
distribution:
(1 - r)D + sA p
1 - p
(3)
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where,
A = the indebted country’s assets abroad (e.g., public 
assets on which the sovereign has a direct control, 
such as embassies and consulates, and private 
assets on which the sovereign has only an indirect 
control);
r = the indebted country’s repudiation rate; and
s = the share of the debtor’s assets holding abroad 
seized by the creditor.
Given that the creditor’s subjective distribution of returns 
is as displayed by equation 3, the mean and variance of y are 
perceived by the creditor to be:
E(y) = (1 - rp) D + psA (4)
and
var(y) = (1 - p)D2 + p[( 1 - r) D + sA]2 - [(1 - rp)D + psA]2
= p (1 - p) [r2 D2 - 2rsAD + s2A2]. (5)
It is postulated that the creditor’s preferences over the 
random returns can be represented by the mean-variance 
expected utility function:
E[u (y)] = E(y) - 0.5Rcvar (y) (6)
where Rc denotes the creditor’s degree of absolute risk 
aversion.
4
(See Hlawitschka, AER 1994, for a recent discussion of the 
generality and suitability of this framework.)
The substitution of equations 4 and 5 into equation 6 
implies that the creditor’s expected utility from the debt- 
repayment and seizure of the sovereign’s assets can be 
rendered as:
E[u (y)J =  (1 - rp)D + psA - 0 . 5 R C p ( I - p) [r2 D 2 - 2rsAD + s2A 2 ]. ( 7 )
Note that by delaying the decision about the retaliation level 
on future repudiation until realization of the state of the 
world, the creditor is running a risk of losing a collateral once 
a ‘bad’ state of world is realized, as such a delay might give the 
indebted country and its citizens an opportunity to liquidize 
and repatriate their assets abroad. Therefore, it is optimal for 
the creditor to chose the seizure rate in advance so as to 
maximize the above expected utility. This choice is made 
subject to the collateral constraint that s<l.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximum constrained- 
expected utility from debt repayment and seizure of the 
indebted country’s foreign assets are
pA + Rc p( 1 - p) (rAD - sA2) - T < 0 (8a)
s[pA + Rc p( 1 - p) (rAD - sA2) - V] = 0 (8b)
s < 1 (8c)
r  > 0 (8d)
where F is the Lagrange multiplier representing the shadow 
value of the collateral constraint.
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These conditions imply that the optimal seizure rate is 
given by
S *  =  {
[(1 - p)RcA]-1 + (D/A)r if T = 0 (9a) 
1 i f T > 0  (9b)
When the collateral constraint is not binding (i.e., A is 
relatively large in comparison to D and hence r=0),  the 
creditor’s best policy is to adopt a ‘tit for tat’ rule by which the 
seizure rate is smaller than unity and linearly increases with 
the debtor’s repudiation rate proportionally to the debtor’s 
effective leverage (D/A). In this case, the optimal seizure rate 
also rises with the creditor’s subjective probability of default, 
and declines with the creditor’s degree of absolute risk 
aversion. It is also important to note that the Khun-Tucker 
conditions imply that even in a ‘good’ state of world, in which 
the indebted country is expected to repay its debt fully (i.e., 
r=0), it is still optimal for the creditor to exercise a positive 
seizure rate in order to compensate for the risk-bearing costs 
stemming from uncertainty about the state of world:
( 10)(1 -P )R CA •
Obviously, when the collateral constraint is binding, the 
creditor’s best policy is a complete seizure of the indebted 
country’s assets abroad.
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3 Creditor’s secondary market reservation price 
for a given repudiation rate
The creditor’s reservation price (Pc) of recycling the indebted 
country’s debt can now be found by substituting the optimal 
seizure rate into equation 7 and dividing the resultant 
expected utility by the debt level.
When the collateral constraint (i.e., A>D), the creditor’s 
reservation price of recycling the indebted country’s debt is
Pc = 1 +
D 0.5
( 1 ' A2 )r + (l-p)RcD (ID
Here, the creditor enjoys a retaliatory edge over the indebted 
country and hence his reservation price is greater than one 
and rises with the debtor’s asset holding abroad, the perceived 
probability of default and the repudiation rate. However, the 
creditor’s reservation price of the sovereign bonds is lowered 
by the creditor’s degree of risk aversion and the sovereign’s 
debt level.
It is more likely that the indebted country’s foreign assets 
are significantly smaller than its external liabilities. In which 
case, the collateral constraint is binding and the creditor’s 
reservation price is found by substituting a unit seizure rate in 
the creditor’s expected utility and dividing the resultant by D:
Pc = 1 - {r + 0.5RC (1 -p) [r2 - 2rA/D + (A/D)2]D - A/D}p (12)
where A/D can be interpreted as the inverse of the indebted 
country’s effective leverage. Note that in this case,
7
- r  = {1 -0 .5R c(l-p ) (13)
Consequently, as long as A/D is larger than the repudiation 
rate perceived by the creditor, an increase in the effective 
leverage raises the creditor’s reservation price of the 
sovereign external bonds proportionally to his degree of risk 
aversion and perception of the probability of default. 
Furthermore, in this case Pc declines with the perceived 
repudiation rate (r) as long as
That is, the likelihood that a rise in the perceived repudiation 
rate reduces the creditor’s reservation price declines with the 
indebted country’s effective leverage and the creditor’s 
assessment of the probability of ‘bad’ state of world, but 
increases with the creditor’s degree of absolute risk aversion.
4 The indebted country’s optimal repudiation rate
The indebted country’s decision problem is postulated as 
setting the repudiation rate as to maximize expected utility 
from the returns on domestic assets and asset holding abroad, 
taking into account, on the one hand, that loan repayments 
reduce the consumption and investment budget; but on the 
other hand, that in the case of a default, the creditor retaliates 
by seizing part or all of the asset holding abroad. The indebted 
country’s decision problem is postulated as setting The 
analysis of the indebted country’s behaviour is also based on 
the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states of world. In a 
‘good’ state of world the indebted country enjoys relatively
r - A/D < 1/Rc (1 -p). (14)
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high revenues and can repay its liabilities; whereas in a ‘bad’ 
state of world the indebted country’s revenues are moderate 
and consequently it cannot repay its external debt fully. It is 
assumed that the creditor provides signals about the potential 
retaliation for any level of repudiation. These signals enable 
the indebted country to assess accurately the seizure rate 
function 0<s(r)<l. It is also assumed that the rates of return 
on domestic assets and asset holding abroad are identical.
In this setting the distribution of the indebted country’s 
consumption and investment budget, x, is given by
f (K  + A ) v  - D 1 _ p 
1 [K + (1 - s ( r ) ) A ] 8 v  - (1 - r)D P (15
where,
K = the indebted country’s domestic assets;
v = the rate of return on assets under a ‘good’ state of 
world; and
8 = the ratio of the indebted country’s revenues under 
a ‘bad’ state of world to those attainable under a 
‘good’ state of world (0 < 8 < 1).
The distribution of x implies that the mean and variance of 
the indebted country’s consumption and investment budget 
are
8(X)  = [ (K + A)v - D] (1 - p) + { [K  + (1 - s (r)) A] 8v - (1 - r) D}p (16)  
and
9
var(x) = E(x2) - (E(x))2
= (1 - p) l (K + A)v - D ]2 + p { [ K  + (1 - s (r)) A]  Sv - (1 - r) D } 2 
+ { |K + A)v  - D] (1 - p ) +  { (K + ( l  - s ( r ) )  A )  Sv - ( I - r )D]p}2. ( 1 7 )
Suppose that the indebted country’s preferences on 
consumption and investment can be represented by the 
following mean-variance expected utility function:
w here Rd is the indebted sovereign ’s degree o f  absolute risk 
aversion . Then , by su bstitu tin g  equ ation s 16 and 17 in to 
equ ation  18, the indebted  country ’s decision  problem  can be 
rendered as
M a x i m i z i n g  { [ (K  + A ) v - D] (1 - p) + { [K  + (1 -s (r)) A] Sv - (1 - r) D jp  
-0.5R(]  {(1 - p )  f (K + A ) v - D ] 2 + p { [ K  + (I  - s(r))A] Sv - (I - r ) D } 2 
+ { [ ( K  + A) v - D ]( l  - p ) +  ( ( K  + (l  - s (r)) A ) Sv - (1 - r) D i p } 2 }.
w ith respect to r and subject to the repudiation constraint
The Khun-Tucker conditions for maximum expected utility 
from consumption and investment are:
p[D - s'  (r) 8vA] {  1 - Rd [ (K + (1 - s (r))A)8v - (1 - r)D] (1 + p)
E[u (X) ] = E(X) - 0.5Rd var(X) (18)
r < 1. ( 1 9 )
- Rd [(K + A ) v - D ] ( l  - p ) } - | i < 0 (20a)
r { p [ D - s ' ( r )  SvA] {  1 - Rd [ (K + (1 - s(r))A)Sv - (1 - r ) D ] ( l  + p)
Rd [(K + A)  v - D] (I - p ) } - p }  = 0 (20b)
10
r < 1 (20c)
|i > 0 (20d)
where p is the Lagrange multiplier representing the shadow 
price of the repudiation constraint.
Suppose now that the indebted country’s asset holding 
abroad is sizeable and/or the returns on these assets are 
sufficiently large, and the penalty for repudiation is perceived 
to increase substantially with the repudiation rate so that the 
indebted country refrains from practising a complete 
repudiation and repays a part of its loans (i.e., p=0 and hence 
r< l). Under this assumption, the optimal repudiation rate 
from the indebted country’s perspectives should obey the 
following equality:
1 - Rd {[ (K + (1 - s (r))A)8v - (1 - r)D](l + p)
- [(K + A) v - D]( 1 - p )} = 0. (21)
That is, a change in the costs of risk bearing stemming from 
an infinitesimal increase in the repudiation rate should be 
offset by the change in the expected consumption and 
investment.
5 Equilibrium  rate of repudiation and the 
secondary market price
When the collateral constraint is binding and the probability of 
a ‘bad’ state of world is perceived by the creditor to be high, 
the creditor exercises a complete seizure of the indebted 
country’s asset holding abroad before these assets would be
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liquidated by the indebted sovereign. In turn, it is optimal for 
the indebted country to repudiate fully its external debt, and 
consequently, by virtue of equation 12, the value of the 
sovereign external bonds in the secondary-market is smaller 
than one as indicated by the following expression:
P* = 1 - {1 + 0.5RC (1 - p) [1 - 2 A/D + (A/D)2]D - A/D}p. (22)
Note that since in this case A/D<1, an increase in A/D would 
raise the price o f the sovereign external bonds in the 
secondary market. This effect is amplified by the creditor’s 
degree of absolute risk aversion.
In contrast, in the less likely case where the indebted 
country’s asset-holding abroad is sufficiently large so that the 
collateral constraint is not binding, the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium secondary-market price of the sovereign external 
bonds is greater than one. Under the assumption that the 
indebted sovereign and the creditor have identical assessment 
of the distribution of the state of the world (i.e., p) and that 
they fully know each other’s considerations, this equilibrium 
price can be found as follows. First, the substitution of the 
optimal seizure rate indicated by equation 9a into the debtor’s 
optimality condition 21 implies that in equilibrium the debtor’s 
optimal repudiation rate is:
,  K ‘ -P> - (l+P )8]v(K +A ) +2pD + +
r “  (l-dv)(l+p)D
Subsequently, the substitution of r* into equation 11 gives the 
equilibrium price of the sovereign external bonds in the 
secondary market:
12
p* -  I i — —  _D_ s . 
F “  1 + (l -p)RcD + (!  A2 }Pr (24)
Equations 23 and 24 indicate that the effect o f the 
probability of a ‘bad’ state of world on both the equilibrium 
repudiation rate and secondary-market price is not clear and 
straightforward as suggested by equation 2. These equations 
lead to the following propositions:
i. If 8 < 7 (i.e., the ratio of rate of return on assets in a
, P‘bad’ state of world to that in a ‘good’ state of world is 
sufficiently small), the larger the sovereign domestic 
assets and asset-holding abroad the higher the 
equilibrium rate of repudiation and the secondary market 
price.
ii. If 8 < }  P , the higher the rate of return on the
1 + p 6
sovereign assets in a ‘good’ state of world the higher the 
equilibrium rate of repudiation and the secondary market 
price.
iii. The higher the creditor’s and debtor’s degree of absolute 
risk aversion the lower the equilibrium repudiation rate 
and secondary-market price of the sovereign external 
bonds.
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